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The Scottish verdict of not proven represents a second acquittal verdict which is not legally
defined. Existing research into the influence of the not proven verdict on jury decision
making is modest. The main aim of the current study was therefore to investigate the
influence of verdict systems (two vs three) on juror decision making. The effect of pre-trial
bias and evidence anchors on juror judgements were also examined. One-hundred and
twenty-eight mock jurors listened to two homicide vignettes and were asked to rate their
belief of guilt of the accused and to give a verdict in both trials. The results suggest that pre-
trial bias was a significant predictor of both verdict choice and belief of guilt, whereas
evidence anchors were not a significant predictor of either. Finally, both guilty and not
guilty verdicts were given with increased frequency in the two-verdict system when
compared to the three-verdict system.
Key words: anchoring and adjustment; decision science; heuristics; juror decision-
making; not proven verdict; pre-trial biases; verdict systems.
The legal system’s principles were developed
based on logical, philosophical ideas (Basu,
2006), such as everyone deserving the right to
a fair trial. However, research has demon-
strated that pre-existing biases and intuitive
decision processes may have an effect on how
jurors make decisions (Chapman & Bornstein,
1996; Estrada-Reynolds et al., 2015); thus,
jurors may not be rational, fair agents. The
incorporation of such bias within juror deci-
sion processes may undermine the legal sys-
tem’s ability to provide justice to society. The
current research therefore investigated the
effects of pre-trial biases and initial evidence
anchors (i.e. a piece of information that has a
disproportionate influence on an individual’s
decision processes) on juror decisions across
different verdict-systems, with perceived
‘strong’ (e.g. DNA, forensic science evidence)
versus ‘weak’ (e.g. ambiguous information,
secondary confessions) evidence anchors
(Chapman & Bornstein, 1996).
In addition to legal principles, such as the
right to a fair trial, two separate verdict
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systems have evolved in the UK. The Scottish
legal system has three verdict options, allow-
ing jurors to choose between giving a guilty, a
not guilty or a not proven verdict. The unique
not proven verdict has not been legally defined
(Duff, 1999), but has the same legal implica-
tions as a not guilty verdict. However, it has
been suggested by Curley et al. (2019) that the
not proven verdict represents a belief from a
juror that the accused/defendant is probably
guilty but there was not enough evidence to
convict. Further, a large study examining 969
Scottish jurors (see Ormston et al., 2019) dem-
onstrated that there was confusion about how
the not proven verdict differed from not guilty.
The rest of the UK utilises a two-verdict sys-
tem where only the verdicts of guilty and not
guilty are available to jurors. Jurisdictions in
the United States of America, New Zealand
and Australia also utilise the two-verdict sys-
tem that originated in England. Such differen-
ces across the nations of the UK means that it
is difficult to generalise previous research on
the effects of pre-trial biases from the Anglo-
American system to the Scottish system.
The current study therefore moves beyond
individual juror characteristics and cognitive
processes by also considering structural
aspects of a trial: whether two-verdict versus
three-verdict options would affect verdict deci-
sions or considerations of guilt. The current
study is, to the authors’ best knowledge, the
first paper that investigates the effects of indi-
vidual differences, cognitive structures and
varying legal jurisdictions in unison.
Pre-trial biases
Juror judgements can be biased by extra-legal
factors, such as previous experience of fic-
tional forensic/legal television shows, a vic-
tim’s gender and a victim’s attractiveness
(Maeder et al., 2015; Tyler, 2006; Williams
et al., 2008). Previous research has found that
pre-trial biases can be used to predict verdict
choice in jurors (Lecci & Myers, 2008, 2009).
Further, many models of juror decision-mak-
ing – such as the information integration
model (Ostrom et al., 1978), Bayesian models
(Marshall & Wise, 1975) and the story model
(Pennington & Hastie, 1986, 1992) – have
incorporated prior beliefs, since it is well docu-
mented that prior beliefs can have an impact
on final juror judgements (Lecci &
Myers, 2008).
The story model has been the most domin-
ant model in the juror decision-making litera-
ture for almost 30 years. This model suggests
that jurors create narratives based on the evi-
dence in a trial, pre-trial knowledge relating to
similar crimes/trials and heuristic-based know-
ledge of what makes a story complete
(Pennington & Hastie, 1992; Willmott et al.,
2018). In addition, pre-trial biases can influ-
ence the stories that jurors create (Willmott
et al., 2018). Jurors select a story based on cer-
tainty principles (coverage, coherence and
uniqueness). Uniqueness will explain some of
the juror’s confidence in their story, with
jurors being less confident in stories that are
not unique. Verdicts that best align with a
story are then chosen (Pennington & Hastie,
1986, 1992). Furthermore, pre-trial biases are
likely to influence story construction and ver-
dict outcome (Carlson & Russo, 2001;
Pennington & Hastie, 1986, 1992; Willmott
et al., 2018).
The adversarial system of law may increase
the influence that pre-trial biases have on jurors.
This is because in the adversarial system, two
different narratives are presented to the jury,
thus creating an ambiguous decision context,
where bias dominates (Arkes & Mellers, 2002;
De La Fuente et al., 2003; Kaplan & Miller,
1978). Further, scientific evidence, legalese, the
possibility of multiple charges (i.e. a defendant
facing charges for both homicide and armed
robbery) and different verdict systems make the
courtroom a complex place for a juror (Greene
& Loftus, 1985; Schklar & Diamond, 1999;
Severance & Loftus, 1982). This complexity
may reduce the cognitive effort that jurors are
able or willing to provide, which may increase
the likelihood of jurors relying on pre-trial
biases when making a decision.
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One route to complexity within a jury trial
lies in the comprehension and availability of
different verdict choices. As previously men-
tioned, verdict options are not unified across
the various legal systems in the UK, and the
differences between seemingly similar verdict
options are not always clear. Standard guid-
ance for Scottish criminal procedure states that
the not proven verdict’s meaning should not
be defined or described to juries (Ormston
et al., 2019). However, the not proven verdict
does have the same legal consequences as the
not guilty verdict (Ormston et al., 2019).
Ambiguity relating to the definition of a ver-
dict or the differences between verdicts may
also increase the influence that pre-trial biases
play in the courtroom. Currently, the majority
of the research conducted on the effects that
pre-trial biases have on juror verdicts have
focused on the two-verdict system. This means
it is currently unknown how pre-trial biases
influence juror decisions in the Scottish three-
verdict system.
There are many possible factors that could
lead to pre-trial biases. Rather than attempting
to summarise or investigate every possible
pre-trial bias, the current research will only
utilise the pre-trial bias score as measured by
the Lecci and Myers (2008) Pre-trial Juror
Attitude Questionnaire (PJAQ); see Materials
for discussion of the constructs in this
questionnaire.
Anchoring and adjustment
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) were the first
to study the anchoring and adjustment heuris-
tic. This heuristic occurs because human deci-
sion makers have limited cognitive capacity
and tend to use initial pieces of information as
anchors, particularly in complex environments
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). However, deci-
sion makers do not sufficiently adjust from
these anchors when integrating subsequent
information in a decision-making process
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This means
that decision makers who use the anchoring
and adjustment heuristic deviate from
normative models of decision-making. Since
the interpretation of novel cues is biased
towards the initial anchor it is unlikely that a
rational decision will be reached (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974).
Epley and Gilovich (2006) proposed that
individuals use the anchoring and adjustment
heuristic when the decision-making environ-
ment is uncertain. They suggested that in self-
generated anchoring experiments, where the
anchor is generated by the participants and not
provided by the experimenter, individuals
knew that the anchor they produced was incor-
rect, but they believed that their anchor was a
good enough starting point (Epley & Gilovich,
2006). Epley and Gilovich found that individu-
als who had a low cognitive load, and were
therefore more able to process information
efficiently, were able to adjust more suitably
and to a greater extent from their existing
anchors. This is because the less cognitive
effort one is motivated or willing to expend on
a certain task, the less likely one is to adjust
rationally; thus, promoting heuristic and/or
biased decision-making (Epley & Gilovich,
2006; Simon, 1956).
In a mock case where a woman sued her
health-maintenance organisation for their
potential involvement in her developing ovar-
ian cancer, Chapman and Bornstein (1996)
suggested that the anchoring and adjustment
heuristic could be applied to juror decision-
making. They found that the strength of an evi-
dence anchor (i.e. a piece of evidence used as
an anchor) had an impact on liability judge-
ments made during the case. Jurors who were
shown strong evidence anchors (high chance
of prescribed pill causing cancer) were more
likely to perceive the defendant as liable than
those shown weak evidence anchors (low
chance of prescribed pill causing cancer).
Jurors who were shown strong evidence
anchors also perceived the defendant to be
more to blame for the plaintiff’s injuries. The
anchoring and adjustment heuristic has also
been shown to influence both judges and jurors
when estimating financial penalties in civil
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cases (Greene & Bornstein, 2003, 2013;
Guthrie et al., 2002; Orr & Guthrie, 2005). The
current study therefore extends on the research
of Chapman and Bornstein by testing whether
evidence anchors (strong-first vs. weak-first)
influence juror decision-making in crim-
inal trials.
Three- versus two-verdict system
Scotland’s three-verdict system, with its add-
itional verdict of not proven, originated in the
18th century (Barbato, 2004). This verdict sys-
tem came to be as in the late 17th century
Scottish jurors were only allowed to find indi-
vidual factual allegations proven or not proven
rather than to return a general verdict of guilty
or not guilty, which was a question for the
judge to answer based on those findings
(Barbato, 2004). However, in the 18th century,
jurors were allowed, once more, to give ver-
dicts that indicated the guilt (guilty and not
guilty) of the accused. Despite the reintroduc-
tion of guilty and not guilty verdicts, the not
proven verdict came to be used by jurors as a
general verdict (Barbato, 2004), thus birthing
the Scottish three-verdict system.
Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the not
proven verdict, in 2015–2016, of the 7806
people acquitted in Scottish courts 1173 were
given the not proven verdict (Scottish
Government, 2021). Scepticism towards the
not proven verdict has lasted for centuries,
with Sir Walter Scott christening the not pro-
ven verdict as ‘the bastard verdict’ because of
its lack of legitimacy. More recently, Miss M
(who successfully sued a man after a criminal
trial found him not proven of rape) has been
campaigning for the removal of the not proven
verdict (BBC News, 2019). Her campaign was
based on the fact that the not proven verdict is
used disproportionately often in rape trials
(Criminal Proceedings in Scotland, 2011). One
reasoning for this may be that the availability
of two acquittal verdicts may increase the
chances of truly guilty individuals being
acquitted (Rape Crisis Scotland, 2019).
Four previous publications/reports have
investigated the effects that the not proven ver-
dict may have on juror/jury decision-making
in an attempt to understand how jurors inter-
pret said verdict. Research has shown that the
availability of the not proven verdict is likely
to influence the frequency by which guilty and
not guilty verdicts are given. Smithson et al.
(2007) found in murder trials that the introduc-
tion of the not proven verdict decreased the
number of not guilty verdicts given. Since the
Smithson et al. study, Hope et al. (2008) and
Curley et al. (2019) have found similar results
in sexual assault and murder trials, respect-
ively. Further, there seems to be consensus in
the literature that the not proven verdict
decreases the number of not guilty verdicts
given by jurors. Ormston et al. (2019) found
that the availability of the not proven verdict
led to a significantly lower number of guilty
verdicts being given by jurors in physical
assault trials. Such effects have not been seen
as consistently, but the findings of Ormston
et al. may have emerged because of the more
realistic nature of the trial stimuli they used
when compared to those in previous experi-
mental investigations. Furthermore, research
has shown that the structure of the legal envir-
onment (number of verdicts available) may
influence the verdict choices of jurors
(Ormston et al., 2019).
The way that jurors interpret the not pro-
ven verdict may be a key factor that influences
juror decisions and consequently affects the
frequency at which not guilty and guilty ver-
dicts are made. Jurors seem to interpret the not
proven verdict as a middling verdict, where
they may perceive the accused as guilty but
are not sure beyond reasonable doubt (Curley
et al., 2019, 2021). Therefore, jurors who are
just shy of reasonable doubt in a two-verdict
system may be forced to return a not guilty
verdict, but in Scotland, they can show their
scepticism relating to the innocence of the
accused and the Crown’s case through return-
ing a not proven verdict (Jackson, 1998). This
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reasoning may, therefore, explain why the
availability of the not proven verdict may
reduce the number of not guilty verdicts
that jurors return. Further, research suggests
that accused individuals who are given the
not proven (over a not guilty) verdict are
likely to face worse social sanctions in the
community (Hope et al., 2008), highlighting
the importance of testing the influence of
the three-verdict system on not guilty ver-
dict returns.
Legal professionals may view legal stand-
ards such as beyond reasonable doubt as
objective benchmarks, meaning that convic-
tion frequencies should not be influenced by
the number of acquittal verdicts that are avail-
able (one versus two; Hope et al., 2008;
Jackson, 1998). However, there are a number
of reasons that can be given for the findings of
Ormston et al. (2019; i.e. fewer guilty verdicts
in a three-verdict system). First, the option of
not proven may direct the attention of jurors to
the potential weaknesses of the evidence pre-
sented (Hope et al., 2008; McKenzie, 1985);
there is more focus on the proof provided
rather than on the factual guilt of the accused
(Jackson, 1998). Second, due to the asymmet-
ric dominance effect, jurors may give fewer
guilty verdicts as the addition of another option
(i.e. adding a not proven verdict to a guilty and
not guilty verdict set) may ‘increase the pro-
portion of alternative choices from the original
set’ (Hope et al., 2008, p. 242). Finally, the
three-verdict system may trigger a comprom-
ise effect (Hope et al., 2008; Simonson &
Tversky, 1992), whereby the existence of the
not proven verdict makes jurors perceive guilty
and not guilty verdicts as exaggerated
extremes, and the not proven verdict as a real-
istic option in the middle (i.e. a compromise).
This compromise effect may then decrease the
chances of jurors choosing guilty or not guilty
verdicts when compared to jurors who do not
have the not proven verdict available to them
(Hope et al., 2008). This potential reduction in
convictions has been cited by Hope et al.
(2008) as a potential positive as it may
decrease the chances of jurors picking incor-
rect guilty verdicts, and thus saving the Crown
financially in relation to compensation claims.
In addition, Ormston et al. (2019) found
that the availability of the not proven verdict
did not significantly influence other factors
such as (a) deliberation length, (b) juror par-
ticipation, (c) accuracy of legal issue discus-
sions and (d) the number of issues raised
relating to the evidence. Furthermore, the
influence that the not proven verdict may have
on juror decision-making may be context- and
crime-type dependent.
Previous investigations on juror decision-
making in Scotland have focused mostly on
Scottish specific issues (e.g. not proven ver-
dict) and largely ignored factors that influ-
ence jurors all over the world (e.g. pre-trial
biases). Further, in previous mock juror
studies conducted in Scotland, the Scottish
not proven verdict and its effects on juror/
jury decision processes has been studied
either on its own or alongside other unique
aspects of Scots law (e.g. 15-person jury).
Commonly studied factors that may influ-
ence juror decision-making (i.e. pre-trial
biases) are therefore typically removed from
experimental investigations of Scottish juror
decisions. Therefore, the current study aims
to add to the handful of publications that
exist in the literature by investigating how
pre-trial bias influences jurors in both the
two- and three-verdict systems.
Research aims and questions
The aim of this research is to investigate how
pre-trial biases, evidence anchors and verdict
systems influence juror perceptions of the
defendant/accused and decision outcomes.
Juror perceptions of the defendant were
measured by collecting likelihood of guilt
scores after the presentation of each piece of
information using a visual analogue scale
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(see Figure 1). Decision outcomes were meas-
ured through asking participants to state their




H1. Pre-trial bias will be a significant
predictor of the verdict that is given.
The more biased towards the prosecution
jurors are, the more likely they will be to
give a guilty verdict.
H2. Evidence anchor will be a significant
predictor of the verdict that is given.
Strong-first evidence anchors will lead to
a higher frequency of guilty verdicts.
H3. Verdict systems will be a significant
predictor of the verdict that is given.
The two-verdict system will lead to a
higher frequency of not guilty verdicts.
This hypothesis is derived from the
majority of the literature suggesting that
the availability of the not proven verdict
significantly reduces the frequency by
which the not guilty verdict is given
(similar findings have not been as
consistent with guilty verdicts).
H4. Pre-trial bias will be a significant
predictor of the final belief of guilt score.
The more biased towards the prosecution
jurors are, the higher the final belief of
guilt score will be.
H5. Evidence anchor will be a significant
predictor of the final belief of guilt score.
Strong first evidence anchors will lead to
higher final belief of guilt scores.
No hypotheses were generated for poten-
tial interactions between verdict system, pre-
trial bias and evidence anchors, since no such




Two variables were manipulated within partic-
ipants: (a) evidence anchor (strong-first versus
weak-first); (b) verdict system (two- versus
three-verdict systems). Total pre-trial bias
score was used as a covariate in the analysis
(this score is based on the PJAQ and is
explained further in the Materials section).
Participants were also given two vignettes
(Vignette 1 and Vignette 2); thus, the vignette
variable was included in the data analysis to
ensure that this variable did not have an extra-
neous effect.
Two dependent variables were measured.
The first dependent variable was the verdict
given by the jurors. The verdict that could be
given by jurors was dependent on the verdict
system to which they were assigned: (a)
‘guilty’ and ‘not guilty’; or (b) ‘guilty’, ‘not
guilty’ and ‘not proven’. The second depend-
ent variable was the final belief of guilt score,
which was measured on an accumulated scale
from 0–14, with 0 representing no belief of
guilt and 14 representing a total belief that the
person is guilty; this measure is explained
more in theMaterials section.
In a pilot study (Supplementary Appendix
1) it was determined which pieces of evidence
to present in the weak-first and strong-first evi-
dence anchor conditions. The results of the
pilot study suggested that evidence known as a
secondary confession (where a third party
states that the accused/defendant confessed
their guilt; Neuschatz et al., 2012) was per-
ceived as the weakest evidence anchor, and
DNA evidence was perceived as the strongest
evidence anchor by participants. The weak-first
evidence anchor was therefore secondary con-
fessions, and the strong-first evidence anchor
was DNA evidence.
Participants
A total of 128 participants took part (female ¼
98, male ¼ 30). The mean age of the partici-
pants was 24.93 years (SD¼ 8.02; range¼
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18–61), and 114 participants were students, 13
were not students, and one participant did not
record their occupation. To be included, partic-
ipants had to be eligible to conduct jury duty
in the UK. Participant demographics, includ-
ing ethnicity, were not collected. While this is
a potential limitation, these demographics are
also not considered in the Scottish or the rest-
of-UK jury selection process.
Information about the study and contact
details were advertised on social media
(Facebook and Twitter). Participants who
wished to participate could then contact the
researchers, and an experimental time slot was
allocated to them. Participants were asked to
share the contact details for participating in the
study with friends and family. The current
study therefore used an opportunistic/snowball
sampling scheme to recruit participants.
Ethical approval
Standardised information sheets, consent
forms, instruction sheets, debrief questionnaire
and debrief forms were given to all partici-
pants, and data were stored in anonymised
form, following general British Psychological
Society (BPS) guidelines. Ethical approval for
the study was granted from the host institution
was Edinburgh Napier University.
Materials
Homicide vignettes
Two audio-recorded vignettes were used in the
current research. Both described homicide tri-
als and were limited to 962 spoken words. An
audio playback device was used to play the
vignettes to participants. Each of the vignettes
followed the same structure: there was an
opening statement from the judge, four pieces
of prosecution evidence that were all followed
by counterevidence from the defence, two
closing statements from each of the respective
stances and, finally, the judge who told the
jurors to only give a guilty verdict if they were
sure beyond reasonable doubt. Participants
heard one vignette that began with a strong
evidence anchor (DNA evidence), and they
also heard another that began with a weak evi-
dence anchor (secondary confession); the pres-
entation order of the evidence anchors was
counterbalanced over the set of participants.
All participants listened to both vignettes,
which were given by the same actor; variation
was on the evidence order only. The other two
pieces of prosecution evidence that were pre-
sented to the jurors in each of the vignettes
(Timepoints 4 and 6; see Figure 2), which
were not included as evidence anchors, were a
piece of eyewitness testimony and a piece of
expert testimony given by a psychologist; the
presentation order of each of these pieces of
evidence was also counterbalanced over the
set of participants. For a more detailed discus-
sion of these vignettes see Curley et al. (2019).
Pre-trial juror attitude questionnaire
The PJAQ is a 29-item questionnaire, which
is composed of six constructs, each measur-
ing a separate pre-trial bias: racial bias (four
items); innate criminality (four items); social
injustice (four items); cynicism towards the
defence (seven items); system confidence
(six items); and conviction proneness (five
items); system confidence and innate crimin-
ality share an item. In the current study, par-
ticipants rated these items on a 5-point
Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5
(strongly agree; Mobely, 2007), with two
items being reverse scored to reduce the risk
of response bias. See Table 1 for the possible
minimum and maximum scores that partici-
pants could give in each of the six con-
structs. The PJAQ has been used in number
of recent juror decision-making studies
(Allison et al., 2014; Estrada-Reynolds et al.,
2015; Lundrigan et al., 2016) and has been
shown to outperform other measures, such as
the Juror Bias Scale, when predicting ver-
dicts (Lecci & Myers, 2008, 2009). The
PJAQ has also been shown to have good
internal validity (Lecci & Myers, 2008).
Three of the questions used in the PJAQ
were slightly adapted in the current study to
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make the PJAQ more suitable for a Scottish/
UK court setting. For example, the question:
‘If the defendant committed a victimless
crime, like gambling or possession of mari-
juana, he should never be convicted’ was
changed to: ‘If the defendant committed a vic-
timless crime, like possession of marijuana, he
should never be convicted’ since gambling is
legal in the UK.
The PJAQ has been used in previous
research, and it has consistently been found to
have good predictive and internal validity. For
example, when assessing the predictive valid-
ity of the PJAQ, Lecci and Myers (2009)
found that the questionnaire predicted: (a)
21% of pre-deliberation verdicts; (b) 15.1% of
post-deliberation verdicts; and (c) 7.6% of the
variance in verdict change. Further, Lundrigan
et al. (2016) found that the PJAQ had the high-
est predictive ability compared to other pre-
trial juror bias questionnaires (e.g. juror bias
scale). Finally, the PJAQ has been utilised and
validated in a number of other studies (Allison
et al., 2014; Estrada-Reynolds et al., 2015) and
may therefore be considered as robust.
Belief in guilt scoring system
To measure participants’ belief of guilt, a vis-
ual analogue scale was created (Figure 1).
This scale was printed on separate papers and
was 14 cm wide (0¼ not guilty; 14¼ guilty).
Participants were asked to mark their belief of
guilt on this scale after hearing each piece of
evidence (a total of 11 ratings per vignette,
each time on a fresh visual analogue scale).
Each belief of guilt score was recorded by
measuring with a ruler from the arrow of not
guilty (which symbolised 100% innocent) to
the mark that the participants left on the visual
analogue scale. The final belief of guilt score
was used in the current analysis.
The visual analogue method of recording
belief of guilt scores was used because this
should be an easy task to perform. Previous
measures of perception of guilt have been
numerical or likelihood based (Curley et al.,
Figure 1. Visual analogue scale measuring the belief in guilt score.
Table 1. Minimum and maximum scores for each of the constructs within
the PJAQ.
PJAQ construct Minimum score Maximum score
Racial bias 4 20
Innate criminality 4 20




System confidence 6 30
Conviction proneness 5 25
Total 30 150
Note: PJAQ¼Pre-trial Juror Attitude Questionnaire.
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2018; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000), but it is
possible that statistically naïve individuals
may have difficulties in understanding terms
such as likelihood and probability (Gigerenzer
& Hoffrage, 1995). Therefore, it was deemed
appropriate to use a visual analogue scale to
allow participants to return a belief of guilt
judgement. Participants also gave a final ver-
dict at the end of each vignette.
Procedure
Each participant took part in the study indi-
vidually using a dedicated lab space. They
read an information sheet and then completed
a consent form and demographics question-
naire. The PJAQ was referred to as a ‘legal
questionnaire’ to participants, as the real title
may have indicated to participants that biases
were being tested.
The experiment began by the researcher
playing the judge’s opening statement (here
the judge provided the context of the case,
who the defendant/accused and victim were,
what the crime committed was and when the
event occurred) for their first vignette. Then
participants were asked to give an initial belief
of guilt score using the visual analogue scale
(Timepoint 1). Once the participant had
marked their belief of guilt, the first piece of
prosecution evidence was played on the audio
playback device, with half of the participants
hearing a weak evidence anchor first (Mage ¼
23.67, SD ¼ 6.83; number of females ¼ 51,
number of males ¼ 13) and half hearing the
strong evidence anchor first (Mage ¼ 26.17,
SD ¼ 8.91; number of females ¼ 47, number
of males ¼ 17). Then, once again, participants
marked their belief of guilt (Timepoint 2).
After this, participants heard a rebuttal from
the defence, who cross-examined the person
currently giving evidence for the prosecution
and marked their belief of guilt (Timepoint 3).
Participants then continued this procedure of
listening to information and marking their
belief of guilt for a further six pieces of infor-
mation (Timepoints 4, 6 and 8¼ prosecution;
5, 7 and 9¼ defence); if the first piece of
prosecution evidence presented at Timepoint 2
was a strong anchor, then the last piece of
prosecution evidence at Timepoint 8 would be
a weak anchor, and vice versa.
Two closing statements (one from each
stance) were presented to the participants once
they had heard all of the evidence in the
vignettes. After each closing statement, partici-
pants once again marked their belief of guilt
(Timepoints 10 and 11). Before participants
were asked to give a verdict, they heard the
following statement: ‘Remember, to give a
guilty verdict you must think that the defendant
was guilty beyond reasonable doubt.’
Once the participants had heard all of the
above information, they were asked to give a
verdict. Half of the participants (Mage ¼ 24.03,
SD ¼ 9.31; number of females ¼ 49; number
of males ¼ 15) could give one of two verdicts
(guilty or not guilty) in their first vignette,
whereas the other half (Mage ¼ 25.81, SD ¼
6.39; number of females ¼ 49, number of
males ¼ 15) could give one of three verdicts
(guilty, not guilty and not proven) in their first
vignette. Participants who had two verdicts
available to them in their first vignette had
three verdicts available to them in their second
vignette, and vice versa. Once participants had
completed one vignette and made a verdict,
they were presented with a second vignette.
Both of the vignettes presented to participants
used the same procedure, and the presentation
order of the two vignettes was counterbalanced
across the participants.
Finally, participants read a debrief form
and then confirmed whether or not they con-
sented to their data being used. All participants
gave their consent.
Results
Data organisation and analysis plan
Descriptive statistics of each of the six PJAQ
constructs are reported. Guilt scores averaged
across participants are visualised across 11
timepoints of the strong-first and weak-first
evidence anchor conditions in Figure 2. In the
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analyses, we used verdict given (categorical)
and final belief of guilt score (continuous) as
two dependent variables and verdict system
(two-verdict system vs. three-verdict system),
pre-trial bias (PJAQ score), evidence anchor
(strong-first, weak-first) and vignette (1 and 2)
as independent variables. Model comparisons
in terms of Akaike information criterion (AIC)
and variance explained suggested that conven-
tional as well as mixed-effect models provide
reasonable model fits for linear regressions
on final belief of guilt scores and logistic
regressions on verdicts. Although we did not
postulate any hypotheses about interactions,
we included all interaction effects into
the models.
Focusing on number of guilty verdicts, we
conducted a logistic regression by combining
not proven verdicts with not guilty verdicts
into a new category of acquittal verdicts.
Similarly, focusing on the number of not guilty
verdicts, we combined not proven verdicts
with guilty verdicts into a new category of
other verdicts. Hope et al. (2008) used the
same categorisations when investigating the
effect of verdict system (two and three catego-
ries) on number of verdicts given.
The not proven response category was
only available in one of the two vignettes pre-
sented to each participant. The order of the
two vignettes was counterbalanced across par-
ticipants in terms of verdict system, vignettes
and evidence anchor in a 2 2 2 within-
subjects design with repeated measures and
total pre-trial bias PJAQ as a covariate.
Descriptive statistics for pre-trial bias
constructs and guilty scores
Descriptive statistics were computed for each
of the six constructs within the PJAQ (Table 2).
The scores from the six constructs were
added to create a total pre-trial bias score
(M¼ 76.30, SD¼ 9.81, range¼ 54–101). The
scoring of the PJAQ was conducted in accord-
ance with previous research (Estrada-Reynolds
et al., 2015; Lecci & Myers, 2008, 2009;
Lundrigan et al., 2016). Racial bias was
included in the total pre-trial bias score for two
reasons. First, in other studies, which did not
mention race, racial bias was also included in
the PJAQ score (Estrada-Reynolds et al.,
2015). Second, audio-recorded vignettes were
presented to participants that did not explicitly
reveal the race of the defendant or accused.
In Figure 2 mean belief of guilt scores,
averaged across vignettes and participants, are
plotted for all 11 timepoints. There was consid-
erable noise in the scores across participants.
The lines connect the mean belief of guilt
scores for the weak-first (dashed line) and
strong-first (solid line) evidence anchor condi-
tion. The values at Timepoint 1 reflect pre-trial
bias (e.g. before any evidence was presented)
and suggest a slightly higher belief of guilt
score in the weak-first than in the strong-first
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for each of the constructs within the PJAQ.
PJAQ construct M SD
Racial bias 8.57 2.12
Innate criminality 7.53 2.16
Social justice 12.58 2.30
Cynicism toward the defence 20.16 3.69
System confidence 15.32 3.16
Conviction proneness 13.99 3.23
Note: PJAQ¼Pre-trial Juror Attitude Questionnaire; M ¼ Mean; SD ¼ Standard Deviation.
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evidence anchor condition. The zig-zag lines
reflect oscillations in belief of guilt after hear-
ing first the prosecution and then the defence
statement in alternation from Timepoints 2
and 3 to Timepoints 8 and 9. Both lines show
a similar trend of increasing guilt scores up to
Timepoint 8 and 9. In contrast to the experi-
mental manipulation of evidence anchor the
dashed line (weak-first) shows the largest peak
at Timepoint 2 whereas the solid line (strong-
first) shows the largest peak at Timepoint 8.
Both evidence anchor conditions then assume
a similar score just above 7 at Timepoint 9.
Timepoints 10 and 11 reflect the effect of the
summary statements from the prosecution and
defence on belief of guilt scores. At Timepoint
11 the mean belief of guilt scores show a simi-
lar pre-trial difference between conditions as
at Timepoint 1. Please note that adding the
mean belief of guilt scores across timepoints
leads to an overall larger total belief of guilt
score for the weak-first than for the strong-first
evidence anchor condition.
The effect of pre-trial bias, evidence
anchor and verdict system on juror
decision-making
We tested whether total pre-trial bias (PJAQ),
evidence anchor and vignette predict final
belief of guilt scores and whether total pre-trial
bias (PJAQ), evidence anchor, vignette and
verdict system predict the categorical variable
verdict. Linear regressions with mixed-effects
and two logistic regression models (R-package
lme4, Bates et al., 2015) were established to
predict final belief of guilt scores and the cat-
egorical verdicts, respectively. Descriptive sta-
tistics for final belief of guilt scores and the
frequency of each verdict type can be found in
tables 3 and 4 respectively.
For the final guilt scores, we conducted
linear regressions with pre-trial bias (PJAQ) as
a covariate and repeated measures for evidence
anchor and vignette. We also included by-sub-
ject intercepts as a random effect. The results
of linear regressions with mixed effects (R-
package lme4, Bates et al., 2015) are reported.
Figure 2. Line plots of average guilt scores at Timepoints 1 to 11 for weak-first (dashed line) and
strong-first (solid line) evidence anchor condition. The corresponding shaded areas denote ±1 SE around
the mean.
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The linear regression on the final guilt scores
(Timepoint 11) gave the following findings in
relation to the ability of the model to fit the
data: marginal R2 ¼ .07, conditional R2 ¼ .41.
In the following we report the results of the
mixed-effect models for the final guilt scores
as dependent variable, with reported p values
based on Satterswaithe’s t statistic with
adjusted degrees of freedom.
For the final guilt scores (range ¼ 0–14)
the estimated intercept was 6.85. The results
highlighted that there were statistically signifi-
cant fixed effects of PJAQ (ß¼ 0.0695,
SE¼ 0.025), t(124) ¼ 2.75, p < .007, and
vignette (ß ¼ 0.505, SE¼ 0.161), t(124) ¼
3.13, p ¼ .002, but not for anchor (ß ¼
0.165, SE¼ 1.61), t(124) ¼ 1.02, p ¼
.308. No significant interactions
were observed.
In addition, a logistic regression high-
lighted on guilty verdicts (vs. other) revealed
that the final guilt scores significantly pre-
dicted guilty verdicts (ß¼ 0.666, SE¼ 0.128,
z¼ 4.802, p< .0001), highlighting that the
measure had an adequate predictive ability.
The first logistic regression investigated
the effect of total pre-trial bias (PJAQ), verdict
system, vignette and evidence anchor on the
probability of guilty versus acquittal verdicts.
This model featured all interaction terms
(adjusted R2 ¼ .21). The continuous predictor
variable PJAQ was centred on the mean, and




Guilty Not guilty Not proven
Anchor
Weak-first 41 50 37
Strong-first 27 58 43
Verdict system
Two 42 86 N/A
Three 26 22 80
Vignette
Vignette 1 41 50 37
Vignette 2 27 58 43
Table 3. Final belief of guilt scores grouped by evidence anchor and vignette.
Factor
Final belief of guilt score (0–14)
M (SD) Minimum Maximum
Anchor
Weak-first 7.05 (3.44) 0 13.8
Strong-first 6.7 (3.16) 0.15 13.4
Vignette
Vignette 1 7.83 (3.49) 0.25 13.8
Vignette 2 6.37 (3.03) 0 12.6
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the three categorical variables were deviation
coded to facilitate the interpretation of coeffi-
cients and effects. In the following the reported
p values are based on Wald z statistics for the
logistic regressions (see Supplementary
Appendix 2 for details).
The significant intercept (z ¼ 6.99, p <
.0001) of the logistic regression model sug-
gests that guilty verdicts occurred significantly
less often than acquittal verdicts. The intercept
of 1.20 log odds (odds ratio 0.30) suggests
that guilty verdicts occurred with probability
.23 and acquittal verdicts with (1 – .23) ¼ .87.
Verdict system had a significant effect on
guilty verdicts (z ¼ 2.33, p ¼ .02). The coef-
ficient of 0.80 log odds (odds ratio 0.45)
suggests that on average 55% less guilty ver-
dicts were given when the not proven option
was available, provided all other variables
remained constant. Total pre-trial bias (PJAQ)
was also a significant predictor (z¼ 2.82, p ¼
.005). The coefficient of 0.053 log odds (odds
ratio 1.052) suggested that with every unit on
the total pre-trial bias score the likelihood for a
guilty verdict increased by 5.2%, given that all
other predictor variables remained constant.
Evidence anchor only approached statistical
significance (z ¼ 1.82, p ¼ .07), and
vignette was not significant (z ¼ 0.21,
p¼ .23). Finally, the interaction between
anchor and vignette was significant (z ¼
2.22, p ¼ .03). No other significant interac-
tions were observed.
The second logistic regression was con-
ducted to evaluate the effects of total pre-trial
bias (PJAQ), verdict system and evidence
anchor on not guilty verdicts (not guilty vs.
other). The model featured all main effects
and interaction terms (adjusted R2 ¼ .44). As
in the previous analysis, the continuous pre-
dictor variable PJAQ was centred on the
mean, and the three categorical predictors
were deviation coded. All reported p values
are based on Wald z-statistics.
The significant intercept (z ¼ 2.85, p ¼
.004) of the logistic regression model suggests
that participants gave not guilty verdicts
significantly less often than other verdicts. The
intercept of 0.54 log odds (odds ratio 0.58)
suggests that not guilty verdicts occurred with
probability .37 and other verdicts with (1.0 –
.37)¼ .63. Verdict system had a significant
effect on not guilty verdicts (z ¼ 7.10, p <
.0001). A coefficient of 2.67 log odds (odds
ratio 0.069) predicts that about 93.1% less not
guilty verdicts were given when the not proven
option was available, provided all other varia-
bles remained constant. Total pre-trial bias
was also a significant predictor (z ¼ 3.32, p
¼ .001). The coefficient of 0.066 log odds
(odds ratio 0.935) suggests that with every unit
increase of the total pre-trial bias score the
likelihood for a not guilty verdict decreased by
6.5%, given that all other predictor variables
remain constant. The effect of evidence anchor
(z¼ 0.26, p ¼ .799) and vignette (z¼ 0.64, p
¼ .869) were not statistically significant.
However, the interaction between vignette and
verdict system reached statistical significance
(z ¼ 2.42, p ¼ .015). No other interactions
were significant.
Discussion
The current research investigated the effects of
pre-trial bias, anchoring and different verdict
systems on juror decision-making. It explored
both belief in guilt and final verdict outcomes.
To the authors’ best knowledge, this is the first
paper that investigates the effects of varying
legal jurisdictions, pre-trial bias and evidence
anchor in unison. Further, there are only a
handful of empirical investigations into the
effect of Scotland’s unique not proven verdict
on juror decisions. To this end, the current
study adds significantly to the understanding
of the influence of verdict options on juror
decisions alongside the effects of pre-trial
biases and evidence anchors on decisions in
the court room.
The discussion is structured in line with
the study design, with each of the factors
being examined in turn. First, the effects of
pre-trial biases on juror perceptions of guilt
and the verdicts given are presented. A
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discussion surrounding the influence that evi-
dence anchors had on juror perceptions of
guilt and the verdicts given then follows.
Finally, the effects of different verdict systems
on juror decision-making are outlined.
General findings are then presented, outlining
how the current research can be interpreted
alongside the story model. Future research is
outlined towards the end of this discussion.
Pre-trial bias effect on jurors
Pre-trial bias was found to be a significant pre-
dictor of the verdict that was given and the
final belief of guilt score, supporting H1 and
H4, respectively. The current study therefore
provides evidence of pre-trial biases leading to
pre-deliberation distortion (Carlson & Russo,
2001). This is because pre-trial biases in jurors
may inform how jurors perceive the defend-
ant/accused, which may then influence juror
verdicts. Previous research has suggested simi-
lar effects (Hope et al., 2004).
In a seminal paper by Carlson and Russo
(2001) it was reported that mock jurors natur-
ally developed leading verdicts (i.e. preferen-
ces towards either guilty or not guilty). These
leading verdicts then distorted how jurors eval-
uated novel pieces of evidence. For example,
mock jurors with a guilty leading verdict
would distort evidence from the defence in
favour of their current leading verdict. Hope
et al. (2004) found similar results, with nega-
tive pre-trial publicity causing jurors to favour
the prosecution and consequently distort the
evidence in favour of their preference. The
results in the current study add to this body of
literature, highlighting that pre-trial biases may
lead to preferences towards a particular stance
(prosecution vs. defence), which may then
influence how guilty the accused/defendant is
perceived to be throughout the trial, and these
distorted perceptions may then influence ver-
dict choice.
One implication of the current findings
may be that in legal jurisdictions (e.g. the
American two-verdict legal system) where
voir dire (jury selection) is possible, the PJAQ
might be a useful tool in allowing legal profes-
sionals to make accurate jury selection judge-
ments (Lecci & Myers, 2009; Lundrigan et al.,
2016). Under these jurisdictions, legal profes-
sionals select (directly or not) jurors according
to their own beliefs and experiences
(Lundrigan et al., 2016). However, these selec-
tion strategies are likely to be unreliable and
invalid (Posey & Wrightsman, 2005).
Therefore, the PJAQ may offer a more reliable
and valid method of selecting jurors (Lecci &
Myers, 2009; Lundrigan et al., 2016). In other
jurisdictions, where voir dire is not permissible
(e.g. the UK/Scotland), the current findings
may suggest that the PJAQ could be used to
filter out biased jurors, thus attenuating the
influence that pre-trial biases have on juror
judgements. The current research is the first of
its kind to highlight that pre-trial biases are as
relevant in Scottish three-verdict juror judge-
ments as in two-verdict judgements.
Anchoring effects on jurors
Evidence anchors were found not to be a sig-
nificant predictor for the final belief of guilt
score (H5 not supported) or the verdict given
(H2 can therefore be rejected). These findings
demonstrate that evidence anchors do not
influence juror verdict choices or juror percep-
tions of the defendant/accused.
Nevertheless, it should be mentioned here
that the evidence anchors in this study had the
opposite effect from what was expected.
Strong-first evidence anchors (DNA evidence)
led to lower guilt ratings at Timepoint 2 than
did weak-first evidence anchors (secondary
confessions), despite the strength of these
anchors being initially established in the pilot
study. One explanation for this finding is that
secondary confessions (used in the current
study as a weak anchor) may give jurors some
context surrounding the case (e.g. why or how
the defendant/accused committed the crime).
DNA evidence (used in the current study as a
strong anchor), on the other hand, may merely
highlight that the defendant/accused has some
connection with the victim. Further, DNA
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evidence may be ‘cold’, whereas a secondary
confession might be more emotive and thus
more likely to bias jurors towards more guilty
perceptions of the defendant/accused (D.
Simon et al., 2015). Future research is needed
to further explore this potential explan-
ation, however.
The findings of the current research also
deviate from some of the findings by
Chapman and Bornstein (1996), who found
that evidence anchors could be used to anchor
both causality judgements and liability ratings
in civil court cases. In their study, individuals
provided with strong anchors gave larger caus-
ality judgements and were more likely to per-
ceive the defendant as liable in comparison to
individuals who were shown weak anchors
(Chapman & Bornstein, 1996). Although the
current study was not a direct replication of
Chapman and Bornstein (1996), the measures
used here did mirror the measures used by said
authors. Liability ratings were categorical
(liable, not liable) which is similar to the ver-
dict given variable used in the current study
(guilty, not guilty, not proven). Their causality
judgements were also similar to the final belief
of guilt measure used in the study as both
responses measured the juror’s perception of
the degree of the defendant’s/accused’s role in
the wrongdoing actioned upon the complainer/
plaintiff. Furthermore, the current study’s find-
ings deviate from Chapman and Bornstein
(1996) in relation to the effects that evidence
anchors may have on decision outcomes and
perception of guilt.
An explanation for this difference in find-
ings may relate to an interaction between cog-
nitive mechanisms, evidence weights and
environmental differences (e.g. different court
dynamics and rules). Kaplan and Miller (1978)
suggested that the impact that certain biases or
evidence had in a trial was influenced by the
weights of other pieces of evidence. In other
words, a strong anchoring bias (towards either
the prosecution or the defence) may be attenu-
ated by a subsequent piece of evidence that
was weighted strongly. Interestingly, in the
weak-first evidence anchor condition, the larg-
est spike in belief of guilt score was at
Timepoint 2, when the secondary confession
was presented. Likewise, in the strong-first
evidence anchor condition, the largest spike in
belief of guilt score was at Timepoint 8, when
the secondary confession was presented. After
Timepoint 8, the belief of guilt score was simi-
lar in both conditions.
These findings may highlight that second-
ary confessions increased perceptions of guilt
as they provided context on the defendant/
accused and the crime. However, the influence
of evidence anchors (or particularly strong
pieces of prosecution evidence) on jurors may
be attenuated in a trial through the presentation
of other pieces of evidence with strong
weights (e.g. strong evidence that favours the
defence; see Figure 2), meaning that by
the time a juror is able to reach a verdict, the
effects of evidence anchors of decision out-
comes will be minimal and non-significant.
This interaction between anchoring and
evidence weight described above may explain
the difference in findings between the current
research and that of Chapman and Bornstein
(1996) when the environmental setting of each
study is taken into account. The current
research was based in the criminal court,
where the beyond reasonable doubt standard is
applied, whereas Chapman and Bornstein
(1996) study was conducted in the civil court
using a lower standard of proof (i.e. the bal-
ance of probabilities). Furthermore, when
strong evidence attenuates the effects of evi-
dence anchors in the criminal court, the higher
standard of proof may further reduce the effect
that anchoring has on verdict outcomes.
However, in the civil court, where the standard
of proof is lower, early evidence anchors may
be more likely to influence the final outcome.
In other words, subtle anchoring effects may
be more likely to influence decisions in civil
court trials.
An alternative, yet related, explanation
may relate to the fact that the Chapman and
Bornstein (1996) study only presented
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participants with a one-sided piece of paper
describing the trial, meaning that there was a
limited space for subsequent pieces of infor-
mation to attenuate the effects of the evidence
anchor. In the current study, four pieces of
prosecution evidence (each with a rebuttal
from the defence) and a closing statement
from each stance were presented. This would
have increased the chances for the respective
pieces of evidence to dilute the effects of the
evidence anchor on the decision outcomes of
the jurors. Other cognitive fallacies and heuris-
tics, such as the overconfidence effect, have
also been found to disappear once participants
are tested in a less artificial setting
(Gigerenzer, 1991; Weiten & Diamond, 1979).
In summary, variations in degree of ecological
validity and/or type of trial may explain the
differences found in the current research when
compared with the Chapman and Bornstein
(1996) study.
Verdict systems
The verdict systems variable was a significant
predictor of the verdict that was given, allow-
ing H3 to be accepted. Interestingly, the results
highlighted that the availability of the not pro-
ven verdict led to a significant decrease in the
number of guilty and not guilty verdicts given
by jurors; this effect led to a larger reduction
in the likelihood of giving a not guilty ver-
dict, however.
Explanations as to why the availability of
not proven verdict may decrease not guilty and
guilty verdicts are now discussed. First, jurors
in a three-verdict system may be less likely to
give a not guilty verdict in comparison to
jurors in a two-verdict system as the not pro-
ven verdict may represent the mindset of most
jurors more adequately in certain trials (i.e.
they do not think the crown proved their case,
but they also do not think the accused is inno-
cent; Jackson, 1998). Second, jurors in a three-
verdict system may be less likely to give a
guilty verdict than jurors in a two-verdict sys-
tem due to: (a) the availability of the not pro-
ven verdict focusing jurors to the weaknesses
of the evidence; (b) the not proven verdict
being used as a compromise by a juror when
guilty and not guilty verdicts seem poles apart;
(c) addition of the not proven verdict causing
an asymmetric effect that decreases the pro-
portion of both guilty and not guilty verdicts
(Hope et al., 2008; McKenzie, 1985;
Simonson & Tversky, 1992). Further research
would like to tease apart which explanation is
most likely.
Practically the current findings highlight
that a trial in Scotland will have a decreased
probability of a guilty verdict being given in
comparison to if the same trial was held in
comparable jurisdictions with two verdicts
(e.g. England or Wales). Similarly, truly inno-
cent individuals will be less likely to receive a
not guilty verdict in Scotland than those tried
in England and Wales. Despite the not proven
verdict having the same legal outcomes as the
not guilty verdict, individuals who receive the
former may be more likely to face social sanc-
tions (Hope et al., 2008). The implications of
these findings are complex. For instance, the
decreased guilty verdict frequency may
decrease false positives in the conviction rate,
equally though they may increase the rate of
false-negative acquittals. Further, a decrease in
the likelihood of receiving a not guilty verdict
may stain a truly innocent person’s record, but
may also cast doubt on the innocence of a truly
guilty individual who would have been given a
not guilty verdict if the not proven verdict was
not available. We therefore urge the Scottish
legal community to consider these findings
and reflect upon the best possible course
of action.
General discussion
The findings of the current study lend some
support for the story model (Pennington &
Hastie, 1986). As previously mentioned, in the
story model, a narrative is created from three
main aspects: (a) case-specific information; (b)
knowledge of how stories are created; and (c)
knowledge of similar events. Two of these
three pieces of information that form the
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narrative that jurors create have their origins in
pre-trial information. Likewise, previous
research has shown that evidence evaluation is
influenced by preferences towards certain ver-
dicts (Carlson & Russo, 2001; Hope et al.,
2004). Therefore, pre-trial biases may also
influence juror story construction, meaning
that evidence distortion may be the conse-
quence of evidence being interpreted in line
with pre-trial biases in order for a coherent
narrative to be produced (Carlson &
Russo, 2001).
Evidence anchors (such as secondary con-
fessions) may also set the scene and provide
jurors with context surrounding the defendant/
accused and the trial, which may then influ-
ence how novel information is interpreted.
However, the impact of evidence anchors on
verdict choices may be attenuated in a trial
through the presentation of novel pieces of evi-
dence with strong evidence weights.
Therefore, for the creation of a narrative sur-
rounding a trial, the presence, rather than the
position, of a piece of evidence may be the
important factor, as stories will be created
through the integration of several pieces
of evidence.
Nevertheless, once narratives have been
created, they are then selected based on cer-
tainty principles (Pennington & Hastie, 1986).
The verdict that best aligns with the selected
story is then chosen. In the two-verdict system,
the best fitting verdict (and thus the verdict
chosen) will be either guilty or not guilty.
However, in the three-verdict system, the best
fitting verdict for some stories might be the
not proven verdict, causing jurors to be less
likely to select guilty and not guilty verdicts.
This may then highlight that a binary verdict
system does not give a full enough representa-
tion of guilt for jurors to match their stories
onto fully. Therefore, the not proven verdict
may allow jurors to communicate their belief
of guilt more accurately to the courtroom
(Curley et al., 2019). Nevertheless, if pre-trial
biases (e.g. innate criminality, racial biases
and rape myth; Lecci & Myers, 2009;
Willmott, 2016) are informing how narratives
are formed, the availability of the not proven
verdict, as the best fitting verdict for a narra-
tive, is problematic (Ormston et al., 2019).
Because of this, the Scottish legal community
should review the current paper and make rec-
ommendations relating to the usefulness of the
not proven verdict. Furthermore, the current
study has highlighted how the story model can
incorporate both different verdict systems and
the influence of pre-trial biases within it.
Limitations
One potential limitation of the current study
was that authors decided to utilise a within-
subjects design for the evidence anchor and
verdict system conditions. As the mock jurors
in the current study saw two trials, their
experience will be unlike that of real jurors
who would have only witnessed one trial. The
researchers believed that an initial study that
used verdict system as a within-subjects elem-
ent was needed, as individual difference sur-
rounding the knowledge of the not proven
verdict may have acted as an extraneous vari-
able in a between-subjects design. This is due
to the fact that the majority of TV court-based
dramas aired within Scotland are set within
English or American (two-verdict) court-
rooms. Thus, a significant proportion of the
Scottish population do not know about the
existence of the not proven verdict and/or do
not fully understand its meaning (Hope et al.,
2008; Ross, 2019). Future research should rep-
licate the current study using more ecologic-
ally valid materials in a between-subjects
design to establish whether findings are con-
sistent in more realistic settings.
A second potential limitation of the current
study was that variables such as ethnicity were
not collected. This was done for two reasons.
First, previous studies (e.g. Hope et al., 2008)
had not collected information on ethnicity.
Second, the research team believed that it was
unethical to ask participants further questions
that we did not believe to be pertinent to the
research question and which would not be
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analysed. However, future research should col-
lect participant ethnicity data to allow those
descriptive data to be presented alongside
other findings about demographics.
Future research
One line of enquiry from the current study
relates to how other additional verdicts may
influence verdict choice. The current study
found that the inclusion of the not proven ver-
dict significantly decreases the frequency of
both not guilty and guilty verdicts. Future
research could investigate how other additional
verdicts, such as the guilty but mentally ill ver-
dict and the diminished responsibility verdict
(Smithson et al., 2007), influence verdict
choice. In addition, other jurisdictions have
different legal proceedings. In Spain, for
example, the judge presents a series of propo-
sitions, and the jury declares each of the said
propositions proven or not proven (Thaman,
1999). A final avenue for future research
might be to add a condition to the factor of
verdict system, in which participants could
give a proven and/or not proven verdict. This
condition may more adequately reflect how
legal professionals perceive the role of the jury
in the courtroom (Curley et al., 2021;
Jackson, 1998).
Conclusion
The current study presents a novel approach to
investigating pre-trial biases, anchors and ver-
dict systems within juror decision-making.
Three main findings were established. First, it
was found that pre-trial bias had a significant
effect on (a) final belief of guilt score; (b)
guilty verdicts; and (c) not guilty verdicts.
Second, evidence anchors did not significantly
predict verdicts or the final belief of guilt
score. One explanation for this is that evidence
anchors may anchor beliefs of guilt, leading to
guilt adjustments with each piece of novel
information being influenced by the previous
piece of information. However, as a trial pro-
gresses, and other pieces of evidence that are
weighted strongly are presented, the influence
that evidence anchors have on jurors and their
ensuing verdict will be reduced. Third, it was
found that jurors were more likely to give both
guilty and not guilty verdicts in the two-verdict
system than in the three-verdict system.
These findings can be interpreted through
the story model. Pre-trial biases may set the
scene for the narrative. Subsequent evidence,
and associated perceptions of the defendant/
accused, may then be interpreted in a manner
that fits the opening narrative created by their
pre-trial biases. The verdict system may then
play a role in relation to which verdict best
matches their constructed, and chosen, story.
In a two-verdict system, the narratives can
only lead to guilty or not guilty verdicts.
However, the addition of a third (non-legally
defined) not proven verdict may better fit
some constructed stories, meaning the not pro-
ven verdict may allow individuals to commu-
nicate their belief of guilt more accurately.
However, when pre-trial beliefs, such as rape
myths, influence chosen narratives, the avail-
ability of the not proven verdict is more prob-
lematic. The topic of the unique Scottish
verdict is regularly discussed but research of
its influence on jury decision-making is in its
infancy. Further research exploring the influ-
ence of different verdict systems on jury deci-
sion-making is encouraged by the authors.
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